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The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the trading relationship in agricultural goods that the United Kingdom (UK) will have when it leaves the European Union (EU). The decision of the UK to leave the EU has raised many questions, including some on the nature of the trading relationship that the UK will have with the EU and third countries once it leaves the EU.

For agriculture, the UK will need to develop its own agricultural policy as it will no longer be subject to the Common Agricultural Policy and one constraint on the development of that policy will be the Agreement on Agriculture concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations.

This paper examines the three pillars of that Agreement – market access, domestic support and export competition – to determine the commitments that the UK may make in each pillar and then looks at two other relevant agreements, the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement, to complete the discussion of the scope of the UK nascent agricultural policy.

The value of the paper lies in the discussion of the obligations to be assumed by the UK under the Agreement on Agriculture and the contours of UK agricultural policy once it leaves the EU.

This paper aims to reflect on the first 20 years of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body’s jurisprudence, specifically as it relates to questions of normative fragmentation. It provides an overview of some of the highlights of the WTO’s jurisprudence as it pertains to fragmentation, with particular focus on the use of general public international law in the context of the WTO dispute settlement.

The paper adopts a traditional interpretive legal method, applied to the case law of the WTO.

The paper suggests that the Appellate Body’s approach has not been driven by the institutional myopia and normative closure of which they are sometimes accused, but rather a judicial sensibility which (rightly or wrongly) valorises the virtues of modesty, caution and self-restraint.

The paper contributes to the literature on the causes of fragmentation, drawing attention in particular to the importance of international lawyers and tribunals in contributing to fragmentation, not just responding to it. The fragmentation of international law is, in part, the product of ongoing boundary work, and the “fragmentation jurisprudence” of the Appellate Body has predictably involved boundary work of a particularly intense kind.

The purpose of this research note is to draw on the concept of compliance as developed in international relations theory to point to future avenues of research. It is widely understood that the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system has worked well in the past 20 years. Surprisingly, however, systematic research on compliance with WTO law is still in its infancy.

The research note draws a distinction between first-order and second-order compliance and discusses limitations of existing work and possible ways forward.

This note suggests that more work, both conceptually as well as empirically, needs to be carried out.

Very little systematic research has been carried out on compliance with WTO law.

This paper aims to examine the issues faced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system in disputes involving questions of regulatory convergence. The traditional focus of the WTO has been on increasing market access and eliminating discrimination in trade. Now, as tariffs have been all but eliminated and Members rarely impose obviously discriminatory trade barriers, attention increasingly turns to questions of regulatory convergence. Leaving aside questions as to the overall benefits of regulatory convergence between markets, these developments pose a significant challenge to the organs of the WTO dispute settlement – and it is here that this paper focuses.

While General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO law has fairly well-developed tools for identifying discrimination in trade, the tools necessary for assessing whether regulatory measures maintain the requisite balance or proportionality between sovereign/domestic concerns and trade concerns are less clear. The paper discusses this latter point.

The WTO agreements are frequently not clear on where or how this balance between sovereign/domestic concerns and trade concerns is to be determined. To date, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have preferred to focus on whether they can identify any discriminatory aspects of a measure. However, they will increasingly be called to pronounce on non-discriminatory regulatory policy choices of Members.

This paper contributes to the literature on the Appellate Body, and argues that Members will need to develop a credible and consistent balance between policy space and trade restrictiveness.

This paper aims to clarify the role that economic methodology and approach can help the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body (AB)make better decisions. The author discusses two prominent disputes to demonstrate how economics could have resulted in improved AB decision. First, there is the question of whether countervailing duties can continue to be imposed subsequent to privatization of state-owned enterprises. Second, there is the frequently challenged zeroing issue.

The author uses a case study method. He reviews the details of specific disputes and explains how standard microeconomic methods would have produced greater clarity in the determinations and hence promoted a more efficient dispute resolution process.

In this commentary, however, the author addresses a frustration with the AB, namely, the reluctance of the AB to embrace economics in its decision-making. He argues that economic methods would produce superior determinations.

This paper fulfils an identified need to document how economic methods would have led to better AB decisions.

This paper aims to offer an overview of papers in the WTO @ 20 collection.

An overview of the papers in the WTO @ 20 collection, complete with a personal perspective on the continuing relevance of the organization.

This paper adds further support to the notion that the compliance rate with the WTO dispute settlement system and the “quality” of judgments handed down require greater study and less impressionistic reporting.

This paper positions the papers in the WTO @ 20 collection in their appropriate context.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the success of the world trade organisation (WTO) dispute settlement system and its transferability to other fora.

The paper compares the design and case law of trade and investment law, and seeks lessons for the settlement of trade and investment disputes in other fora.

It concludes that despite its shortcomings, the WTO Appellate Body provides vital stability regarding legal interpretations, something notably absent from other fora.

The paper offers the perspective of a former Member and Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body on the success of the dispute settlement system.

This paper aims to examine changes in the jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization Appellate Body in three areas of law (judicial economy, the identification of the measure to be examined under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other duties and import charges), and concludes that the Appellate Body failed to acknowledge and cogently explain in each of these areas, the changes it made.

The paper asks two key questions: what has the Appellate Body done when its own rulings in past cases stood in the way of a legally sound ruling in a new case, and how should it handle such instances in the future?

The paper concludes that all changes in jurisprudence reduce predictability, but that predictability suffers even more when the changes are made in disguise because panels and Members then receive confused or conflicting normative signals.

The paper argues that the Appellate Body should seek consistency of jurisprudence wherever possible. It should handle changes in jurisprudence more transparently and adopt internal procedures that make the need for them less likely.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate by text and empirical facts, the need to reform the rules in force.

This study confronts current standards with empirical facts. To do this, it is postulated that even though current market access standards are better that the Gatt 1947 rules, they leave the possibility for some members to hijack them to eventually increase their protection effective tariff.

Market access standards for agricultural products should be reformed because of their asymmetry. To put an end to this asymmetry, these standards should be rebalanced. This is precisely the challenge of the current multilateral negotiations.

Unlike the studies conducted on this subject (to my knowledge), which are mainly based on economic or political science methods, this analysis is essentially based on legal reasoning law.